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or  sexual orientation.Price Adjustment and Soviet Agricultural Reform:
A View Using Lithuanian Farm Data
The effort to reform collectivized agricultural sectors  in the Soviet
Union and much of Eastern Europe includes a complex array of changes in
property relations, land tenure, pricing, marketing, and financial
arrangements.  For most advocates of agricultural reform the  desired
endpoint is a market economy with some degree of government regulation.
Yet the  speed with which to introduce reforms  in pricing, marketing,
tenure, and other areas, and the sequence  in which reforms should be
staged is  a matter of debate and uncertainty.  This  debate can be made
more concrete and given an empirical dimension by focusing on the
centrality of land in the reform process.
In the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries that most closely
followed the  Soviet model,  agricultural land has historically been owned
by the state  and managed collectively by farms  that do not pay explicit
fees for  its use.  Proposals for reform of land tenure have taken several
forms, but each requires that agricultural producers pay for land use.  If
user fees are to be introduced, land must be valued.  Yet the current
distorted pricing system plus  the absence of functioning land markets
complicates  land valuation.  The problem of valuation when land markets
are missing is  a difficult one that has slowed adoption of new property
relations.  Land must be valued by administrative procedures  in the
initial round of tenure  change when property rights  are redistributed, yet
there  is  little agreement on the basis for or methodology of valuation.
In a well functioning market economy, agricultural land would earn its
marginal value product in agricultural production.  This value  can be
1measured empirically from production data, and can serve as an appropriate
initial value  for users'  fees.  Current users could be offered the right
to continue use  in exchange  for paying the  fee,  or  to  trade the fee and
use rights  to  another producer.  The marginal value product will depend on
the structure of output prices,  the production technology, and managerial
efficiency at  the farm level.  Valuation of land is  intimately linked to
the structure of output prices.  The need to value  land in order for
tenure  change to  proceed gives  a strong empirical argument for
simultaneous reform of prices and tenure or property relations.
In the following discussion I use  farm level data from Lithuanian
state and collective farms to estimate the marginal value product of land
under the current output price structure, and what it would be under
prices consistent with world trading prices prior to producers' adjustment
to new relative prices.  The result of this analysis  is  a suggested
initial value  at which user fees for land could be set in an adminstrative
revision of prices preceeding introduction of full market relations in
Lithuanian agriculture.
The particular parameter estimates  in this work do not generalize to
the Soviet Union as a whole.  Producer prices for grains are higher in
Lithuania  than in the grain belt of the USSR, and prices  for livestock
products, particularly milk, are  lower than in more easterly regions.
Because the USSR is  so large and its  separate regions have not been
connected through rationally interlinked prices,  it  is  inappropriate to
generalize about the  effects of reform on the USSR as a whole from
analysis of a particular region.  A realistic picture of the effects of
economic reform on Soviet agriculture can only be built from detailed
2study of pricing and production in the  individual regions.  Conclusions
based on analysis of average prices throughout the USSR do not capture the
potential  for better utilization of regional comparative advantage and
interregional trade within the country, and this would be a major payoff
of the reform.  The methodological approach of this paper;  i.e.;
estimation of marginal value products of land under alternative output
price structures in order to arrive at administratively determined initial
user fees for land, could be used throughout the USSR as  the methodology
of valuation accompanying tenure and price reforms.
Strategies of Price Revision and Reform
Eastern European economies face major adjustments of agricultural
prices in severely distorted markets for  food and fiber.  Agricultural
price reform is  one of the most sensitive political and economic  issues
for  the reformers, and its management  is crucial  to public perceptions of
the progress of the entire reform.
The Polish and Soviet cases reveal  two contrasting approaches to price
adjustment.  The Poles have chosen to reduce demand rapidly by removing
most consumer subsidies and controls on producer prices, allowing food
prices to rise several fold with partial wage indexation.  International
commodity donations are intended to augment short term food supply and
mute price  increases, but the remarkable movement of food prices  in the
last months of 1989 and early 1990 can only be characterized as  a shock to
the demand side.  The Poles have given less attention to deconcentration
of credit, input markets,  and processing to  sustain a longer term supply
response after transitional commodity aid is used up.
3The Poles have  gambled that a shock to  the demand side will be less
painful in the long run than a prolonged adjustment.  The Soviet approach,
in contrast, has been cautious in the extreme.  To date  (early 1990),  the
Soviets have been unwilling to adjust retail food prices until supplies
increase.  They have thus  rejected one important  instrument  in the design
of agricultural reform;  i.e.,  price reform.  The agricultural reform
pursued with increasing urgency after 1988 has been limited largely to
tenurial reform.  Lease contracts,  and most recently  (December, 1989)
individual proprietorships have been offered (Brooks, 1990).
Leasing, private proprietorship1 and private ownership necessitate
valuation of land and introduction of land payments.  Valuation under the
current pricing system, with a multiplicity of prices for  the same
product,  is difficult and yields distorted asset values and poor resource
use.  The centrality of land valuation to the process of tenurial  reform
makes it very difficult to promote new property relations without price
reform.  The attempt to achieve a supply response through tenurial  reform
prior to price reform thus appears flawed.
The Soviet reluctance to force demand side adjustment can be attributed
to several factors.  The international community is not likely to offer
transitional commodity aid.  The Soviet populace has not yet shared the
euphoria of political renewal that makes Eastern Europeans willing to
accept temporary economic hardship, including higher food prices.  Yet in
the agricultural areas on the western border of the Soviet Union, where
nationalist sentiment is  strongly and broadly felt, greater political
independence and cultural autonomy could provide short term political
enthusiasm to cushion the impact of radical economic reform, including
4higher food prices.  Price reforms initiated here as  part of a supply
promoting reform could have a demonstration effect for other parts of the
USSR.
A sudden shift to  full market relations in these areas, however, would
be even more complicated than in Poland.  Crucial economic variables,
including output prices, land values, and the exchange rate would be
simultaneously undefined in the transitional period in the USSR, and would
generate great uncertainty for producers and consumers.  In Poland
tenurial reform and land valuation are not central to the  immediate agenda
and the exchange rate  is well defined.  The uncertainty would increase
costs of transition in the USSR and undermine public confidence  in the
reform.
An alternative  to rapid full  introduction of market prices is  price
revision while administrative measures of control or price support still
function.  Initial values for land use fees consistent with the revised
prices would be  set, and then market relations introduced by dropping
state orders (procurement quotas).  Market relations would bring market
prices,  including changes  in land values, but the price revision could set
initial values from which the transition to a new equilibrium could begin.
A price revision prior to freeing prices is  likely to reduce uncertainty
on both the supply and demand sides during the transitional period.
Implicit Land Values Under Current and Revised Prices
Land has historically been offered to farms  in the Soviet Union without
charge.  Implicit land rents have been collected through differentiated,
farm specific output prices.  One objective of the economic reform is  to
5make  the domestic price system more consistent with world prices.  This
can be attempted by setting output prices equal to border prices  (adjusted
for transportation costs),  and deriving land use  fees based on the
marginal value product of land with existing factor productivity and
technology.
The following discussion is based on data from the  1986 and 1987 annual
accounts  (godovye otchety) of 1032 state and collective farms in
Lithuania.  The Lithuanian data are  additionally valuable because they
include measures of land quality rarely available with production data.
Lithuanian researchers have made detailed analysis of different soil types
on each of the state and collective  farms.  Each farm is assigned a soil
quality indicator  (bonitet) based on the yield of a standard crop
(standardized according to  feed units) on comparable soil under conditions
of average management.  The variable measuring land quality  (bonitet)
ranges  from 27  to  66 with a mean value of 41.-
Prices received by Lithuanian producers for sales to the state are
shown in Table 1 and displayed in quartiles to  show the dispersion among
farms.  The prices are unit values, and include all premia for quality,
quantity, and farm specific differentials.  For example, the one quarter
of milk producers who received the lowest prices in 1987 were paid on
average 335 rubles per ton of fluid milk, while the quarter of producers
who received the highest prices were paid on average  352 rubles per ton.
The base price for milk in Lithuania according to the latest national
round of price revision (1983)  is  310 rubles per ton.
Comparison of Lithuanian prices with those in Latvia,  Estonia,  and
Belorussia indicates some significant differences.  Belorussian prices  for
6milk and meat are significantly higher, as shown in Table 2.  The price
dispersion across  republics within this  relatively small region
illustrates the adjustments that reform would bring.  These adjustments
would facilitate better use  of resources specific  to each locality, and
expanded gains from interregional trade within the country.
Procurement organizations have traditionally paid different prices to
different farms  for the same product.  Price differentiation enters
through zonal pricing and through  the bonus system.  Several bonuses can
raise received prices above base prices.  The most important are quality
differentials, bonuses  for sales in excess of a moving average of past
years, and premia for  farms in financial stress. 2
The Lithuanian data show price differentiation, but the degree appears
to be less  than reported in other parts of the Soviet Union. In 1987 15%
of Lithuanian state and collective farms had profitability (rentabel'nost)
of 10% or  less  (which would qualify them for bonuses  of up to  75%  of base
prices  in many parts of the country).  The data do not show that these
farms received high bonus prices for meat or milk, suggesting that special
bonuses for financially weak farms were not widely used in Lithuania.  A
strong negative correlation between meat prices and land quality in 1987
is  shown in Table 3, indicating that farms on poor quality land were paid
higher prices for livestock products.  The 1986 data also show a strong
negative correlation between meat and milk prices and land quality.
Differentiated livestock prices appear to be the mechanism through which
implicit land rents  are collected in the current price structure.
Border prices converted  into rubles at exchange rates of two and four
rubles  to the dollar are  also shown in Table 1 for reference and
7comparison.  The border prices for commercially traded products are prices
c.i.f.  northern European ports adjusted to  farm gate product definitions.3
For example,  the beef price  is beef c.i.f.  northern European ports
adjusted to live weight using the standard Soviet coefficient of  .55  live
weight  to carcass weight.  The border price for milk  is equivalent to $10
per hundredweight converted to rubles at  the stated exchange rate.4 For
little traded products, such as potatoes, the listed border price is  the
marginal price of the third quartile of domestic producers;  75%  of
domestic producers received a price  at or below the  listed price.  In
choosing this price for nontraded products, I assumed that the price  (for
average quality)  after the reform would be based not on the highest
current price, but on one that was in the high end of the current range.
Border  (or domestic third quartile marginal prices) are intended to serve
as a benchmark for revised prices that would be consistent with world
prices.
Relative prices in Lithuania differ from border prices;  grains and
milk are relatively low and meat is high.  Virtually all dairy producers
receive less  than border prices even at  two rubles  to the dollar and the
difference is  greater at four.  Meat prices are not as  low relative to
world values as  are milk prices.
Differentiated prices and meticulous measurement of land quality were
intended to capture rents associated with preferential access  to land at
no  cost (Poshkus, 1979).  If the system worked well, farms would show a
range of profitability, but there would be no systematic link between land
quality and profitability, unless some other factor contributing to
profitability were  strongly correlated with land quality.
8Table 3 shows pair-wise correlation coefficients for prices, land
quality, and profitability in 1987.  For example,  farms that  received high
prices  for rye tended also  to receive high prices for barley, as  indicated
by the positive, significant correlation coefficient of  .28.  Individual
product prices tended not to be strongly correlated with farm
profitability, except for poultry.  Land quality, on the other hand, was
positively and significantly correlated with profitability;  the
correlation coefficient is  .36 between land quality  (bonitet) and
profitability  (rentabel'nost').  Farms  in the lowest quartile according to
profitability had an average indicator of land quality of 38.50, compared
to 44.52 for  farms  in the highest quartile of profitability.
Even though there  is a significant correlation between land quality and
profitability  (suggesting that not all  implicit land rents are  taxed away
through prices), not all  farms with high quality land are highly
profitable.  The range of land quality within profitability quartiles is
greater than the difference in mean quality across  quartiles.
Regression analysis indicates that variation in land quality is  a
significant contributor to variation in net output when output is
aggregated with actual unit values received by each farm.  Regression
coefficients  for log linear production functions are  shown in Table 4.5
The dependent variable in Table 4 is  farm level net output aggregated at
prices actually received.  Net output excludes all product used for feed,
whether produced on the farm or purchased.  Output prices vary among
farms, and hence this  dependent variable  is  flawed as a measure of output
or productivity.  It does allow, however, a view of the contribution of
factors of production to farm revenues under the current distorted pricing
9structure.  The independent variables in this regression are  land quality
(bonitet),  land quantity  (one unit of cropland is assumed equivalent to
two units  of hay land),  labor in reported hours worked, ruble expenditures
on fertilizer, machinery in reported horsepower units, and an aggregate of
animals with swine, sheep, and goats weighted at  .3  of a cow.  The table
shows separate estimates  for the  full samples of over one thousand farms
in 1986 and 1987,  and sub-samples  in 1987 grouped in profitability
quartiles.
Results for another set of regressions  are displayed in Table 5.  The
dependent variable in Table 5 is  net output aggregated at border prices
invariant across  farms and converted into rubles at  two rubles to the
dollar.  The independent variables in Table 5 are the  same as in Table 4.
The difference in estimated coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 thus shows the
effect of the domestic price structure on returns to factors of
production compared to returns using world prices  (but keeping the  same
technology and physical productivity.)
If price differentiation (in the domestic price structure) had
succeeded in fully capturing rents  associated with superior land quality,
the regression coefficient associated with land quality  (bonitet) in Table
4 would presumably be small.  It is  in fact rather large  (.53 for 1986)
and precisely measured (t-12.74).  When net output is  aggregated with
border prices invariant across  farms  (Table 5),  the contribution of land
quality to variation in net output  is  even greater (coefficient - .81,
t-20.66).  This suggests  that the current prices differentiated at the
farm level capture some of the rent associated with high quality land, but
not all.
10Descriptive  data characterizing the  farms  in the 1987 samples are
displayed in Table 6.  Table 6 indicates that  farms with different levels
of profitability show little difference in farm size  (mean size  is  about
2200 hectares  of cropland and weighted hayland in each category).  More
profitable  farms pay slightly higher wages but employ the same number of
hours,  spend a little more on fertilizer,  command more machinery power,
and have a few more animals.  The  farms of different levels of
profitability are  remarkable for  their similarity in average command of
factors of production.  They differ more in net output than in inputs, and
the difference is more pronounced under the domestic price structure than
under world prices.
Marginal value products  for all factors of production calculated from
sample means of the 1987 regressions with actual prices are displayed in
Table 7.  Marginal value products for land quantity and quality evaluated
at sample means for all regressions are shown in Table 8.
The estimated marginal value products  (Table 8) range  from
approximately 40 rubles per hectare of average quality land to
approximately 150, depending on year, division of the sample, and prices
used to aggregate net output.  The full sample of 1032 farms  in 1987 shows
a low value for a hectare of average quality land (40 rubles),  and a high
value  for deviations from average quality  (9.99 rubles per point of
bonitet above or below the mean).  When the sample is broken into
profitability quartiles, the dispersion of quality within the quartiles is
reduced somewhat, since quality and profitability are positively
correlated.  In the profitability based subsamples,  the value of a hectare
11of average quality land (average for the quartile)  is greater and the
value of a unitary deviation of quality from average is  reduced.
The substitution of uniform border prices  (at two rubles to  the dollar)
for actual received prices raises both the value of land and the value of
land quality, since  the contribution of quality is  not taxed away through
the price system.  This  is apparent in both 1986 and 1987.
The estimated values for  land quantity appear reasonable,  although they
span a wide range.  One could conclude  conservatively that a farm manager
able  to sell output at border prices  (at  two rubles to  the dollar) would
be willing to pay approximately one hundred rubles for use of a hectare of
average quality cropland, if payments  to other factors of production do
not exceed their marginal value products.  Introducing payments for  land
while  retaining the current price structure would be more problematical.
The regressions  indicate that the user fee for land would be lower,
perhaps by as much as  a half, and the gradation according to quality would
also be  less than if output prices were revised.  Introducing uniform user
fees  (differentiated by quality) without output price revision would
penalize livestock producers on high quality land.  User fees without
price reform or revision could thus bring a negative instead of positive
supply response.
Is  100 rubles per hectare a high or low rental rate?  Minnesota's mixed
dairy, feed, wheat, hogs, and sugar beet economy is superficially similar
to Lithuania's.  Cash rents  in Minnesota have been declining since 1983
and are now $50 per acre  (240 rubles per hectare at 2 rubles  to the
dollar) for average quality land.
12The valuation of a unit of land quality is  consistently high and of
little practical use.  A unit of bonitet valued at  10 rubles  (see Table 8,
1986 and 1987  full sample) for deviations  from the mean would imply that
if average quality land (bonitet-40) is worth 100 rubles per hectare,  then
poor quality land  (bonitet-30) is worth nothing, and good quality land
(bonitet=50) is worth 200 rubles per hectare.  It seems more sensible to
use  the regression analysis to establish a marginal value product for land
of average quality  (bonitet-40 in this sample),  and then set an
arbitrarily defined interval around it for valuation of a unit of quality.
If, for example, a unit of bonitet  is valued at 3 rubles, poor quality
land  (bonitet-30) would be valued at a 30% discount relative to average,
and the highest quality land (bonitet-67) would be valued at 180 rubles
per hectare.6
The analysis further suggests  that a share contract in Lithuania in
which all inputs besides land are separately priced should give the parent
farm about 10% of output, plus perhaps a risk premium.7 The share of
revenue paid for land should not exceed the share of land's  contribution
to net output if land is  to be paid its marginal value product, and costs
of other purchased inputs are not shared.  The regression coefficients for
land quantity using actual prices received (Table 4) range from  .07 to  .11
in the subsamples, and are  .045 and .13 in the full samples  for 1987 and
1986, respectively.
From these estimated elasticities,  it  can be concluded that the  share
of land's contribution to variation in net output is approximately 10%,
and not greater than 15%.  Land users asked to pay a higher share than
this  for use of land will adopt uneconomically land-saving technology that
13will increase  society's costs of producing a given level of output.  The
fragmentary evidence  on lease contracting reported from various  regions  of
the USSR suggests  that collective and state farm managers often charge
share  leaseholders a higher  share than can reasonably be expected to
correspond to  land's contribution to net output  (Brooks, 1990b).
Border prices at two rubles to  the dollar represent relative prices
significantly different from current prices in Lithuania.  If border
prices were adopted and converted at two rubles  to the dollar, the
combined impact on mean net farm output would be  surprisingly small.
Prices  for milk and grain would be higher and meat  lower.  Since most
farms  in Lithuania are diversified producers of milk, meat, and cash
crops,  the price changes  implied by border prices  (at two rubles  to  the
dollar) would be offsetting in their initial  impact on aggregate farm
incomes.  This is  shown in Table  6;  there is virtually no difference in
mean net output calculated with actual prices and border prices converted
at  two rubles to  the dollar.
The adoption of border prices would bring gains and losses at the  farm
level  even though the impact on mean net output  is  small.  Ninety percent
of producers in 1987 would have had net farm output at border prices  (at
two rubles  to the dollar) within a range of 83%  to 115%  of received net
farm output (actual prices).  The ninety percent interval for 1986  is
bounded by  .81 and 1.19.  Thus  the introduction of prices based on border
prices converted at  two rubles to the dollar would bring short run gains
and losses between 10% and 20% of farm income for ten percent of farms.
Long run changes would depend on the supply response  to the new relative
price  structure.
14The finding that net farm output in Lithuania would change little if
border prices  (at two  rubles to  the dollar) were substituted for  current
prices  is new and important.  Its importance  is enhanced by the absence of
any rigorously justifiable estimates  of an equilibrium exchange rate  for
the ruble.  In the new legal hard currency auction held in Moscow in
January the exchange rate was eleven rubles to the dollar on a trading
volume  of eight million rubles, but few would argue for  that as  an
equilibrium rate  in a fully open economy  (Ekonomika i zhizn',  No. 4, 1990,
p. 2).
Without knowledge of an equilibrium exchange rate, those designing the
price revision can be guided only by an understanding of the  impact of
alternative exchange rates on farm incomes and consumer budgets.  The
Lithuanian data indicate that an implied exchange rate of less than two
rubles  to  the dollar would bring a highly undesirable  supply shock
associated with the new price structure.  In some parts of the Soviet
Union where producer costs and prices are higher than in Lithuania,  a
supply shock may be a necessary part of the adjustment process to remove
marginal producers.  There is  little indication of a need for exit of many
marginal producers  in Lithuania,  if they can operate with the current
relatively low producer prices.
Although current levels  of farm income are roughly consistent with an
exchange rate of two rubles  to the dollar, and producers are realizing
implicit rents under  the current system, it would be difficult to
introduce land payments without raising the general  level of producer
prices and incomes.  Farms  currently retain implicit land rents  and
reallocate them to cover other expenses and investment.  If required to
15pay explicit rents without augmented incomes, many farms would be pushed
further into financial difficulty or bankruptcy.  Almost half of the farms
in Lithuania already fall in the range of profitability considered to
indicate questionable long-term financial viability.  There  is little
economic justification for forcing exit of producers who cannot compete
at an overvalued exchange  rate, and most observers would agree that  the
ruble  is overvalued at  two  to the dollar.
An implied rate of three or  four rubles  to the dollar would allow
payments  for land and higher producer incentives  for most products.  If
the rate chosen is higher than the equilibrium rate  that emerges as  the
economy opens, agricultural prices can be expected to adjust upward over
time.  The constraint in choice  of an exchange rate on which to base
revised agricultural producer prices  is  clearly what the demand side can
absorb at  the time of revision.
Producer prices based on border prices converted at three or four
rubles  to the dollar run directly into constraints  imposed by the demand
side.  Consumers will face significantly higher prices when the subsidy
covering the difference between retail prices and current producer prices
is  removed.  The demand side adjustment would be even greater if subsidies
were removed and producer prices simultaneously revised upward, as would
be the case with a ruble exchange rate of 3 or 4 to the dollar.
Alternative Compensation Programs  to Cushion the Impact on Consumers
Retail price policy has stymied revision or reform of producer prices
in the past, and it continues  to present difficult dilemmas.  Retail
prices are kept low by large payments from the state budget.  This
component of the agricultural subsidy cost  90 billion rubles at the
16national  level  in 1989,  or roughly 11%  of GNP.  In Lithuania the budgetary
cost of the subsidy for food consumed in the republic  is  1.39 billion
rubles,  or about 30 rubles per capita per month.8
If  the subsidy were distributed as  a compensatory per capita payment of
thirty rubles per month, it would augment  the money income of a family of
four with two earners on average 30%.  The compensation would be a higher
relative payment for poorer and larger families.  Without detailed
information on income distribution and family budgets,  it  is  difficult to
judge whether compensation of this magnitude would exceed or  fall short of
the increment in food costs  for most families.  The subsidies  are known to
go disproportionately to higher income urban families who have
preferential access  to food at subsidized prices.  It is  thus  likely that
removal of the subsidies and distribution of the total as equal per capita
compensatory payments would overcompensate many poorer families  and
undercompensate the wealthier.  It would thus  improve the income
distribution without distorting wage payments by linking compensation to
wages.
If revised producer prices were based on an exchange rate of three or
four rubles  to the dollar, retail prices would be even-higher,  since the
current subsidy would be removed and producer prices would simultaneously
be increased by a factor of 1.5 or 2 on average.  In that case per capita
monthly payments of thirty rubles would leave many families unable to
cover their additional food costs, and arguments in favor of a targeted
compensation program would increase.  Means tested and commodity specific
compensation programs  could be considered.  Poorer people receive most of
17their subsidy through dairy products, which are widely available in
Lithuania at subsidized prices, while meat  is not.
Conclusions
Agricultural price reform in the USSR has been postponed in the hope
that tenurial  reform will bring a supply response before prices go up.
The old price system, along with constraints  on marketing and input
supply, limits  the attractiveness of new contractual relations  to
producers, and distorts  the values of leased assets.  Leaseholders are
expected to pay user fees for land that  the parent farms do not pay.
Neighboring farms receive different prices for their output, and
leaseholders who market independently get a lower price than state or
collective farms.  The multiplicity of prices complicates the contractual
negotiations and leads  to monetization of current distorted asset values.
Lithuanian farm accounts  for 1986  and 1987 suggest  that farms are
currently receiving on average between 40  and 100 rubles  annually in
producer rents  for use of a hectare of average quality land.  Producer
rents on individual farms vary according to the prices received on that
particular  farm.  If prices were standardized and changed to border prices
converted at two rubles  to the dollar, the marginal value product of
average quality land would be higher  (146 rubles per hectare in the  1986
data, and 90 rubles  in the 1987 data).  Farms could be asked to pay that
amount in rent without exceeding land's contribution to net output.  If
prices were aligned with world prices at two rubles to the dollar,
however, most Lithuanian farms would not increase their  incomes very much,
and payment of 100 rubles per hectare would worsen financial  stress. If
prices were standardized and increased to border prices converted at
18three  rubles  to the dollar instead of two,  the marginal value product of
average quality land would be approximately 150 rubles per hectare  (1987
data).  Producers could pay that much without additional financial stress,
although movements  in prices of other inputs are  also relevant.
If all  agricultural users paid land use fees and had access  to the same
prices  for inputs and output, state and collective farm managers would be
more eager to offer land for lease or private proprietorship  or ownership.
Agricultural  price reform would thus  facilitate changes  in land tenure and
land management.
Producer prices corresponding  to border prices converted at three
rubles  to the dollar would present a shock to retail prices.  Consumers
probably could not be fully compensated for the  increase, and targeted
compensation would be appropriate.
19Table  1:  Lithuanian Producer Prices
(Unit values,  rubles per ton,  1987a)
Quartiles Grouped According to Prices Received
Lowest  Highest  Baseb  Borderc  Border
25%  Median  75%  Prices  2 rubles/$  4 rubles/$
Rye  162  169  186  170
Barley  135  150  172  130  260  (feed  (  520
quality)
Oats  115  136  171
Wheat  125  133  160  130 
Potatoes  125  143  167  125  167  334
Beets  59  59  61  58  40  80
Beans  323  476  625
Fruit  254  334  400  398  796
Beef*  2506  2680  2892  1550  2200  4400
Mutton*  2564  2651  2798  2200  1540  3080
Pork*  2447  2685  3000  2100  1540  3080
Poultry*  2000  2079  2323  1540  3080
Milk  335  343  352  310  440  880
Wool  4626  5000  5667  5000  10000
* live weight
Sources:  a) Godovye otchety, 1987, Lithuanian SSR.
b) Chursin, A. M. Tsenv i kachestvo sel'skokhoziaistvennoi
produktsii,  Moscow, Kolos, 1984.
c) 1987-88 Commodity Trade and Price Trends.  John Hopkins University
Press,  1988.
Price  Prospects for Major Primary Commodities 1988-2000.  The World
Bank, 1989.
20Table 2:  Producer Prices 1988
Average unit values  (rubles per ton) -
Total receipts/Total  tons sold to state
Rye  Barley  Potatoes  Beef  Pork  Milk  Sugarbeets
Estonia
Collective  221.5  171.1  244.1  2586.4  2303.5  370.4
State  220.9  151.5  230.5  2506.2  2285.1  367.6
Belorussia
Collective  190.1  176.5  153.3  3406.7  2912.9  497.5  70.4
State  187.2  169.5  154.6  3361.4  2568.6  528.1  75.3
Latvia
Collective  214.3  160.7  208.2  2902.2  2599.7  414.1  85.9
State  221.3  166.4  183.2  2881.3'  2501.0  421.2  91.0
Lithuania
(1987)  180.1  155.3  155.4  2689.7  2720.5  343.8  60.8
Collective
Sources:  Godovye Otchety, Svodnye, 1988,  listed republics.
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24Table  6:  Sample Means, 1987
Full  Profit la  Profit 2b  Profit 3C  Profit 4d
Sample
No.  in sample  1032  260  259  259  257
Land Quality  40.92  38.50  39.53  41.13  44.52
(bonitet)
Land Quantity  2199  2235  2171  2189  2200
(hectares)
Labor  (hours)  535798  536335  532525  551741  522447
Wage  1.32  1.19  1.30  1.33  1.49
(rubles/hour)
Fertilizer  130608  129492  126799  130324  135818
Expenditure
in rubles
Machinery  13639  12412  13194  13859  15104
(horsepower)
Animals  1068  930  1030  1080  1234
(weighted
aggregated cow - 1)
Net Output  1991851  1591212  1869373  2090193  2423374
(Actual prices)
Net Output  1971870  1590417  1836058  2071387  2396070
(Border Prices
2 rubles - 1$)
Net Output  3943741  3180834  3672117  4142775  4792140
(Border Prices
4 rubles  - 1$)
a  Profit 1:  Rentabel'nost < 15.70%
b  Profit 2:  15.69% < Rentabel'nost < 23.65%
c  Profit 3:  23.64% < Rentabel'nost < 32.01%
d  Profit 4:  32%  < Rentabel'nost
Sources:  Godovye Otchety, Litovskaia SSR, 1987.
25Table  7:  Marginal Value Products, Actual Prices,  1987
Full  Profit la  Profit  2b  Profit 3c  Profit 4d
Sample
Land Quality  9.99  4.41  6.11  4.69  10.30
Land Quantity  40  52  94  64  109
Labor  1.22  1.31  1.52  1.43  1.76
Fertilizer  1.48  1.70  1.49  2.01  .90
Machinery  25.77  12.94  19.24  25.56  26.90
Animals  477  253  344  354  489
a  Profit 1:  Rentabel'nost < 15.70%
b  Profit 2:  15.69% < Rentabel'nost < 23.65%
c  Profit 3:  23.64% < Rentabel'nost < 32.01%
d  Profit 4:  32%  < Rentabel'nost
Sources:  Tables  4 and 6, derived from Godovye otchety, Litovskaia SSR, 1987
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28Endnotes
1.  Private proprietorship  gives the proprietor title  to the land.  The
title can be passed to heirs, but land in proprietorship cannot be bought,
sold, or mortgaged.
2.  Avdiiants,  Iu. P. and A. L. Meiendorf. Tsenoobrazovanie v
agropromvshlennomkomplekse. Moscow, Agropromizdat,  1989.
3.  The border prices are not adjusted for transport differentials within
the Soviet Union.  Lithuania is  small and has a major  ice free port at
Klaipeda linked to the rest of the republic by a road and rail  system
better than in many parts of  the USSR.  Analysis of Soviet producer prices
in areas more distant from borders would require adjustment for transport
differentials.
4.  These reference prices are consistent with prices used in the SWOPSIM
model for  the USSR developed by the Centrally Planned Economies Division
of the Economic Research Service, USDA, but were independently derived
(Cook, 1990).
5.  Translog production functions yielded negative marginal value products
for several factors,  including labor, and are not reported here.  Use of
the translog may not be justified if elasticities of substitution  are
less  important to  the analysis  than are marginal value products  (Boisvert,
1982, p. 32).  The log  linear production functions reported here yielded
reasonable parameters, and the translog did not, even though several of
the cross product terms  in the translog had non-zero estimated
coefficients.
6.  Sale prices of high and low quality agricultural land in Minnesota
show a range of 40% around the price of land of average quality  (Schwab
and Raup, 1989).
7.  As long as  the budget constraint for the parent farm remains  soft,
justification for a risk premium is weak.
8.  Interviews during August, 1989 with economists  in the Lithuanian
Council  of Ministers.
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